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ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
rion is still in the public interest.
-M.D.B.
ALEXANDER V. THORNBURGH, 943 F.2D 825 (8TH CIR. 1991).
Ferris J. Alexander, Sr., defendant, was in the adult entertain-
ment business for over thirty years, showing movies, selling
magazines and selling and leasing video cassettes. It was shown at
his criminal trial that he had consolidated many of his various the-
ater and bookstore businesses under corporation titles, and substi-
tuted names of his employees as a front to conduct his businesses.
None of these corporations filed income tax returns, and two of the
corporations were used to purchase another bookstore and real es-
tate. It was estimated that Alexander underreported his 1982 gross
receipts by $1,322,135 and by $1,416,883 in 1983. In addition, the
trial jury found four magazines and three videos from his business
to be obscene.
Alexander was convicted on 24 counts of a 41 count indict-
ment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota for
tax offenses, obscenity offenses, and Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) violations. He was sentenced to 36-72
months of imprisonment, fined well in excess of $100,000, and or-
dered to forfeit his interest in ten pieces of real estate acquired
from the proceeds of his racketeering activity. Alexander appealed
the conviction, the fines, and the forfeiture on the basis that:
(1)the indictment alleged and the evidence showed, if anything,
multiple conspiracies and not one conspiracy to defraud the
IRS;
(2)the count was defective because it charged a general conspir-
acy rather than a conspiracy to violate a specific statute;
(3)the jury's verdicts on the transportation of obscene materials
counts were inconsistent;
(4)the application of the forfeiture provisions of RICO were un-
constitutional because they criminalized non-obscene expressive
material, violated the First and Eighth Amendments, and the
obscenity standards violated his due process rights;
(5)there was insufficient evidence on all counts to sustain the
verdict below; and,
(6)the District Court should not have entered a summary judg-
ment against him in his civil suit against the government chal-
lenging the use of obscenity as a predicate to RICO on First
Amendment grounds.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Alexander's
conviction on all counts. The court held that whether a conspiracy
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is one scheme or several is a question for the jury, and in this case,
the evidence supported a jury finding of a single conspiracy to de-
fraud the IRS spanning many years and involving many individu-
als in Alexander's businesses. The cases that Alexander relied upon
for his defense to these counts were expressly limited to their facts.
Also, the court instructed the jury that when a count alleges two
different videotapes or magazines to be obscene, they need find
only one of them obscene in order to return a guilty verdict. Thus,
the verdicts returned on the obscenity counts were not inconsis-
tent. The standard of obscenity that Alexander challenged was laid
down by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California,
and therefore the circuit court was bound by it. The forfeiture,
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1467, is allowed when there is a sufficient
nexus between racketeering activities and protected materials ac-
quired through such activities. The court held that obscenity is not
protected by the First Amendment, and a convicted racketeer may
not launder dirty money by investing it in materials that involve
protected speech. It also held that there was no unconstitutional
chilling effect at work because this forfeiture was a criminal pen-
alty and not a prior restraint. Further, the court held that the pen-
alties imposed did not violate Alexander's Eighth Amendment
rights, and there was ample evidence to support his conviction on
all counts.
-C.L.
BOURNE Co. v. TOWER RECORDS, INC., 976 F.2D 99 (2D CIR. 1992).
Walt Disney Company and Buena Vista Home Video appealed
from a preliminary injunction issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, barring their use of
songs from the movie "Pinocchio" on videocassette trailer
advertisements.
-In 1939, Disney and Bourne entered into a copyright agree-
ment which assigned to Bourne copyrights to the songs from the
movie "Pinocchio." Disney claimed that the agreement allowed
them to freely use the songs but only gave Bourne the right to
collect fees for the use of the songs by third parties. Bourne
claimed that, under the agreement, Disney relinquished all rights
to the songs, except for the right to employ them in public per-
formances of motion pictures. Regardless of the proper meaning of
the agreement, over the next five decades Disney used the songs in
ways inconsistent with Bourne's view of its agreement with Disney.
However, Bourne did not object to Disney's use of the songs until
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